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How do people process and evaluate falsehood of sentences? Do people need to compare 
presented information with the correct answer to determine that a sentence is false, or do they 
rely on a mismatch between presented sentence components? To illustrate, when confronted 
with the false sentence ‘trains run on highways’, does one need to know that trains do not run 
on highways or does one need to know that trains run on tracks to reject the sentence as false? 
To investigate these questions, participants were asked to validate sentences that were 
preceded by images (Experiments 1-3) conveying a truth-congruent or a falsehood-congruent 
component of the sentence (e.g., an image of tracks/highway preceding the sentence ‘trains 
run on tracks/highways’) or by words (Experiment 4) that were either sentence-congruent, 
truth-congruent, or both (e.g., the word ‘train/tracks’ preceding the sentence ‘trains run on 
tracks/highways’). Results from four experiments showed that activating sentence-congruent 
concepts facilitates validation for both false and true sentences but that activating truth-
congruent concepts did not aid the validation of false sentences. The present findings suggest 
that a detection of falsehood relies on a mismatch detection between sentence’s components, 
rather than on the activation of true content in the context of a particular sentence. 
 
 







We live in an age of misinformation (Helfand, 2016). Fake news spread fast and wide 
(Lazer, et al., 2018), and seem difficult to detect (e.g., Conroy, Rubin, & Chen, 2015) and 
debunk (see Chan, Jones, Hall Jamieson, & Albarracín, 2017). People adopt false information 
even when they have existing knowledge that should have allowed them to reject it (for an 
overview, see Rapp & Braasch, 2014). This is even more striking given previous research on 
validation, showing that people are proficient at detecting falsehood (Cook & O’Brien, 2014; 
Isberner & Richter, 2013, 2014; Richter, Schroeder, & Wöhrmann, 2009). Arguably, the 
prominence of false information might be taken as failures of validation processes (e.g., 
Pantazi, Kissine, & Klein, 2018), whose mechanisms are not well-enough understood 
(Kendeou, 2014). Thus, it seems crucial to investigate how the mental system validates 
information to explain and prevent such failures. 
The present research accordingly focuses on validation processes: when presented with 
a false sentence (e.g., ‘macadamia are berries’) do people need to compare presented 
information with the correct answer (e.g., ‘nuts’) to determine that a sentence is false, or do 
they rely on a mismatch between the sentence components to detect falsehood (e.g., the 
mismatch between ‘macadamia’ and ‘berries’)? 
Contemporary models of validation in text-comprehension suggest that validation is a 
by-product of comprehension (cf. Gilbert, 1991; Connell & Keane, 2006) and emphasize the 
importance of prior knowledge to the process (Cook & O’Brien, 2014; O’Brien & Cook, 
2016; Richter, 2015; Singer, 2013). The Resonance-Integration-Validation (RI-Val) model 
(Cook & O’Brien, 2014; O’Brien, & Cook, 2016) postulates three asynchronous processes 
that are part of comprehension. In a first resonance stage, incoming information leads to 
active representations in memory. These representations include both the newly encoded 
information, and passively activated long-term-memory components that are related to that 





‘macadamia are berries’ the sentence-components (macadamia, berries) are held to be 
activated together with associations like ‘cookies’, ‘Hawaii’, ‘nuts’, ‘healthy’ or ‘fruit’. In a 
second stage, all activated components are integrated, or linked to each other on the basis of 
general conceptual overlap or goodness of fit. For example, macadamia might be linked to 
berries when both concepts are recognized as food. In a third stage, formed linkages are 
validated against contents from long-term memory by a passive, pattern-matching process. At 
this stage, the mismatch between the active link ‘macadamia – berries’ and the link from 
long-term memory ‘macadamia – nuts’ should be detected. Accordingly, prior knowledge is 
essential to detect that information is false.  
Similarly, Richter et al. (2009) showed that relevant background knowledge is indeed 
used to validate information. Participants were able to routinely reject information as false 
(e.g., ‘Soap is edible’) when they held relevant background beliefs as compared to when they 
did not have such knowledge (e.g., ‘Toothpaste contains sulfur’). In line with these findings, 
validation might be described as an evaluative process that compares incoming information 
with existing knowledge (Richter, 2015). When a mismatch between incoming information 
and existing knowledge is detected, information is rejected as false. Accordingly, the 
accessibility of background knowledge is a precondition for successful validation (Richter et 
al., 2009). Thus, it seems beyond dispute that existing knowledge plays an important role for 
validation processes (Singer, 2019; see also Singer & Doehring, 2014). However, this does 
not necessarily imply that background knowledge needs to consist of a correct answer or 
corresponding true concepts (in the context of the present paper, by ‘true’ we mean ‘in accord 
with general knowledge and well-known facts’ rather than in accord with reality, in line with 
coherence theories of truth; for an overview see Kirkham, 1992). Some information (e.g. 
‘Soap is edible’) does not have a corresponding true concept to compare it to and hence, 
validation might entail having knowledge about semantic network affiliation (e.g., Soap 





sentence components ‘soap’ and ‘edible’ create a mismatch, that once detected leads to the 
conclusion that the sentence is false. Other information (‘macadamia are berries’) might have 
a corresponding true concept (‘nuts’) but could also be validated according to semantic 
network affiliation (i.e., one knows that macadamia are nuts and that they do not belong to the 
category of berries). Accordingly, falsehood could be discovered due to the mismatch 
detection of the components ‘macadamia’ and ‘berries’ or due to the mismatch detection of 
the true knowledge (‘nuts’) and the presented information (‘berries’). 
When different methods of validation (i.e., mismatch detection between sentence 
components or between true concept and presented information) can be utilized, 
comprehenders might engage in minimal semantic processing that is just good enough to 
complete the validation process. In line with the Good-Enough Representations approach 
(Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 2002) comprehenders do not always engage in complete and 
detailed processing of a sentence, so that the latter only occurs if it is required. Thus, if the 
detection of a conceptual mismatch between sentence components is enough to determine the 
validity of a sentence, comprehenders might not access true concepts even if they are 
available (for a similar discussion see Richter & Maier, 2017). More support for this claim 
comes from the Discrepancy-Induced Source Comprehension (D-ISC) model (Braasch & 
Bråten, 2017), suggesting that the detection of a conceptual mismatch or conflict motivates 
comprehenders to invest mental effort and strategically use background knowledge to resolve 
the conflict. When the main goal is to determine the validity of a sentence, comprehenders 
might decide not to spend additional effort as the detection of a conflict is enough to 
determine that a sentence is false. This reasoning is in accordance with semantic integration 
studies (e.g., Berkum, Hagoort, & Brown, 1999), which point at the sensitivity of the mental 
system to semantic violations (e.g., Kutas & Hillyard, 1980) and incongruencies (e.g., 
Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen, & Petersson, 2004; see also Biderman & Mudrik, 2017, for 





see Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). Critically, these studies demonstrated the importance of 
association strength in processing, irrespective of validity (see also DeLong, Urbach & Kutas, 
2005). For example, the sentences ‘cows drink milk’ and ‘cows drink juice’ are both false. If 
validation always involves comparing false concepts (i.e. ‘milk’, ‘juice’) against the true 
concept (i.e. ‘water’) both sentences should be easily detected as false. However, the sentence 
‘cows drink juice’ elicits a greater N400 effect than the sentence ‘cows drink milk’ (see Kutas 
& Hillyard, 1984) and may be more difficult to explicitly identify as false (see Hinze, Slaten, 
Horton, Jenkins, & Rapp, 2014). This might be the case because ‘milk’ and ‘cow’ are part of 
the same semantic associative network but ‘juice’ is not (see also Erickson, & Mattson, 1981; 
Sanford, 2002). Thus, ‘cows drink juice’ might be validated according to a lack of semantic 
overlap between sentence components, while the validation of ‘cows drink milk’ would 
require a different strategy (see also Cook, Walsh, Bills, Kircher, & O’Brien, 2016).  
In this study, we manipulated the likelihood of using different strategies (i.e., mismatch 
detection between sentence components or between true concept and presented information) 
to assess the validity of a sentence that could either be true (e.g., ‘macadamia are nuts’) or 
false (e.g., ‘macadamia are berries’). We used priming to pre-activate concepts that are either 
congruent with true concepts (e.g., ‘nuts’), with false concepts (e.g., ‘berries’) or with a 
component of the sentence (e.g., ‘macadamia’). Both speed and accuracy of validation (i.e., 
determining if a sentence is true of false) were measured, following the different primes. 
Firstly, we investigated if pre-activating sentence-related concepts (i.e., true concepts or 
sentence components) by means of priming can facilitate explicit validity judgments of true 
and false sentences; going beyond previous studies which either (a) did not pre-activate 
knowledge but relied on participants’ existing knowledge in long-term memory (e.g., Richter 
et al., 2009) when investigating validation processes, or (b) examined the effects of pre-
activating concepts on stimuli processing irrespective of validation attempts (e.g., Kutas & 





the unique contribution of detecting the mismatch between sentence components vs. detecting 
the mismatch between the true concept and sentence components to validation processes. 
For true sentences, pre-activation of any sentence-congruent concept should facilitate 
validation. Here, truth-congruent concepts are both congruent with sentence content as well as 
with related knowledge from long-term memory, while falsehood-congruent concepts are 
neither and thus, should not facilitate the validation process for true sentences. A more 
interesting case is posed by false sentences, where truth-congruent concepts are incongruent 
with the sentence content, but activate related knowledge (e.g., ‘nuts’ in the above example is 
a concept that represents the true information that does not appear in the sentence).  
Notably, activating both truth-congruent concepts and falsehood-congruent concepts 
prior to processing a false sentence might facilitate validation processes. For falsehood-
congruent concepts, activation of sentence-congruent information might (a) facilitate sentence 
comprehension, by pre-activating one of the components of the sentence, and, consequently, 
(b) facilitate detection of semantic network affiliation between the sentence components. 
Much like decisions about a target (e.g., a word/non-word decision; Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 
1971) that are facilitated when the target is preceded by the same or a semantically related 
prime (Neely, 1977; Posner & Snyder, 1975), activating a semantic association that is 
congruent with the false concept might lead to a faster mismatch detection between sentence 
components (e.g., that macadamia do not belong to the category of berries).  
Activating truth-congruent concepts might also facilitate validation processes. 
Arguably, truth-congruent concepts allow for an immediate comparison between the content 
of the false sentence and the true background knowledge (O’Brien, & Cook, 2016; Richter 
2015). We accordingly reasoned that several patterns of results might be found, each implying 
a different theoretical account of the role of true concepts in validation processes. If truth-
congruent but not falsehood-congruent primes facilitate validation processes of false 





false information. This would imply that activating sentence-congruent information is not 
enough to affect performance in a validation task. Alternatively, if falsehood-congruent but 
not truth-congruent concepts speed up validation, it would imply that knowledge about 
semantic network affiliation suffices to detect falsehood. That is, what is needed for validation 
is the ability to detect a mismatch between the components of the false sentence, rather than 
the activation of the true information the sentence does not portray. And so, primes that 
already activate one of the sentence’s components facilitate its comprehension and the 
comparison between semantic affiliations. Such an outcome would also imply that truth-
congruent primes, although associatively related, might not activate sentence components 
strongly enough to facilitate validation. Yet another possibility is that the pre-activation of 
both falsehood- and truth-congruent concepts facilitates validation. In such a case, differences 
between facilitation- strengths would indicate whether validation can be carried out on the 
basis of both access to true concepts from long-term memory and knowledge about semantic 
network affiliation (i.e., no difference between truth-congruent and falsehood-congruent 
primes) or whether truth-congruent primes contribute to detection of semantic network 
affiliation (i.e., falsehood-congruent primes lead to stronger facilitation than truth-congruent 
primes). A third alternative is that truth-congruent primes lead to stronger facilitation effects 
compared to falsehood-congruent primes. Notably, truth-congruent concepts are part of a 
respective semantic network, and so it could be argued that pre-activation of any part of the 
semantic network should be helpful to determine semantic network affiliation. Still, the pre-
activation of truth-congruent concepts might aid a unique mechanism underlying validation 
processes, over and above the pre-activation of concepts in the semantic network. As outlined 
earlier, this unique mechanism might be necessary for the discovery of falsehood: arguably, 
detection of the mismatch between information presented in a sentence and true concepts 





case, the pre-activation of truth-congruent concepts should aid validation, over and above pre-
activation of any other concepts in the semantic network. 
All of the above outlined results are compatible with existing models of validation (e.g., 
Cook & O’Brien, 2014; O’Brien, & Cook, 2016; Richter et al. 2009; Richter, 2015), which 
emphasize the importance of background information in validation processes. Importantly 
however, each result will have a different implication regarding the contribution of detecting 
the mismatch between sentence components vs. between the true concept and presented 
information. Accordingly, the goals of this research are twofold: a) to assess the effect of 
knowledge pre-activation on validation processes b) to examine if different types of 
knowledge exert a different effect on these processes. 
 
2. Experiment 1 
To investigate whether pre-activating truth-congruent/falsehood-congruent concepts 
facilitates validation processes for false sentences, participants were presented with sentences, 
and asked to judge their validity (i.e., determine whether they are true or false). We assumed 
that successful validation should translate into ‘false’ judgments when the sentence is false 
and into a ‘true’ judgment when the sentence was considered true (see Isberner & Richter, 
2014; Richter, 2015; Richter et al., 2009). Activation of truth-congruent or falsehood-
congruent concepts in the context of these sentences was manipulated using picture primes 
(see Orenes & Santamaría, 2014), depicting concepts that were either truth-congruent, 
falsehood-congruent or unrelated to the sentences’ content. For example, the sentence ‘trains 
run on tracks’ or ‘trains run on highways’ could have been preceded by an image of tracks 
(truth-congruent), a highway (falsehood-congruent) or a TV test pattern (unrelated). If 
activating background knowledge can facilitate explicit validation processes, either truth-
congruent primes or falsehood-congruent primes (or both) should facilitate validation for false 





judgments should be faster and more accurate when preceded by primes depicting either truth-
congruent or falsehood-congruent concepts as compared to unrelated primes. In case such a 
facilitation is found, one could then inspect its magnitude for the two types of primes. 
Notably, it might be questioned whether priming can selectively activate concepts that 
are either congruent with true or with false concepts, but not with both. Consider, for 
example, the sentence ‘Fire is cold’. Pre-activating the true concept ‘hot’ will activate the 
associatively related concept ‘fire’ to some degree, but also the semantically related antonym 
‘cold’ (for an overview see McNamara, 2005). Nevertheless, true concepts should be 
activated more strongly by truth-congruent primes as compared to falsehood-congruent 
primes, and false concepts should be activated more strongly by falsehood-congruent primes 
as compared to truth-congruent primes (e.g., Hutchison, 2003; Traxler, Foss, Seely, Kaup, & 
Morris, 2000). Thus, the two different prime types have the potential to produce meaningful 
differences with respect to the facilitation of validation processes. 
2.1. Methods 
2.1.1. Participants and design. Eighty undergraduates at the University of Hull (52 
female, 27 male, 1 not reported; Mage = 19.65; SDage = 2.05) participated in an online study on 
‘judgments and visual distraction’ in return for course credit. 1 Due to the nature of the 
experiment being conducted online, in a post-experimental demographic questionnaire, 
participants were asked whether they were native English speakers, interrupted during the 
experiment or in the presence of others while performing the task, and whether they had any 
educated guess concerning the purpose of the experiment.  
 
1 The experiments were approved by the ethics committee of the University of Hull, and informed consent was 
obtained before participants started the task. As this is a new paradigm, we determined the sample size for each 
study beforehand, with the requirement of at least 80 participants in Experiment 1 and 3, based on the 
availability of participants in the department's subject pool. We aimed to recruit as many participants as were 
available during the term of the study. The sample sizes of the online Experiments 2 and 4 were set to 100, 
accounting for potentially incomplete submissions, due to the length of the study. Sensitivity analyses (GPower 
3.1.9.2), assuming a power of (1-β) = .80, revealed that the experiments were sensitive to detect effect sizes of 
ηp2 > .02, for the main statistical effects of interest.  We collected the data for each experiment in one shot 
without prior statistical analyses. We report all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures. Materials 





The study consisted of a 2 (Sentence Validity: true vs. false) × 3 (Prime Congruency: 
truth-congruent vs. falsehood-congruent vs. unrelated) within-participants design. Stimulus 
presentation and response collection were controlled by Inquisit 5.0.11.0.  
2.1.2. Stimuli. We created easy sentences, involving simple declarative facts, with 
universally correct answers (for an overview of experimental sentences see Appendix A). In 
total, 480 sentences were created, half of them true (e.g., ‘Cheetahs run fast’) the other half 
false (e.g., ‘Turtles move fast’). Each participant saw 120 different true and 120 different false 
sentences out of the total number of sentences. A participant never saw both the true (e.g., 
‘Cheetahs run fast’) and the false pairing (e.g., ‘Cheetahs run slow’) of the same sentence 
with a concept. Whether a sentence appeared with a true or false concept was counterbalanced 
between participants. All sentences had the same general structure, whereby the concept was 
presented at the end of the sentence. The mean number of words per sentence was 5.15 (SD = 
1.86). All sentences were presented in random order. 
Primes were pictures of objects or events, taken from Internet resources, that signified 
concepts of the upcoming sentences or were unrelated to them (i.e., a TV test pattern). 
Pictures were selected to signify the truth-congruent and falsehood-congruent concepts in 
sentences as literally as possible. We ensured that pictures did not show the subject of the 
sentence (or elements of it) whenever this was possible. For example, the picture that 
represented the truth-congruent concept for the sentence ‘Broccoli is a vegetable’ showed 
several vegetables (e.g., carrots, bell pepper, kale) not including broccoli. When a literal 
representation was not possible (e.g., for the concept ‘cheap’) close metaphorical 
representations were chosen (e.g., a price tag showing a % sign). 
In total, 240 different pictures were created, corresponding to the concepts mentioned in 
the 240 true sentences, 76 out of 240 were metaphorical representations (see Appendix A). 
For example, a picture of a stopwatch was created to match the true sentence ‘Cheetahs run 





that one third of sentences (80 pictures) were preceded by congruent primes, one third (80 
pictures) was preceded by incongruent primes and one third (80 pictures) by unrelated primes. 
For true sentences (e.g., ‘Cheetahs run fast’), congruent primes (e.g., stopwatch; 40 pictures) 
matched the true concept mentioned in the sentence (e.g., fast) and incongruent primes (e.g., 
hourglass; 40 pictures) represented a potentially false concept (e.g., slow). For false sentences 
(e.g., ‘Turtles move fast’), congruent primes (e.g., stopwatch; 40 pictures) matched the false 
concept mentioned in the sentence (e.g., fast) and incongruent primes (e.g., hourglass; 40 
pictures) represented a true concept (e.g., slow). The assignment of congruent, incongruent 
and unrelated primes to sentences was fully counterbalanced between participants. 
2.1.3. Procedure. Participants saw 240 trials. In each trial, they were asked to judge a 
different sentence as either true or false. Participants were informed that coherent sentences 
about unreal or fictional events (e.g., ‘Dragons breathe fire’) should be considered as true. 
They were instructed that first, a picture would briefly appear on the screen and that they 
should do nothing in response to the picture, as it signaled that the sentence is about to appear. 
The picture referred to concepts that were either truth-congruent, falsehood-congruent or 
unrelated to the sentences’ content.  
Each trial started with a warning signal (+++), presented in the center of the screen for 
500 ms. Subsequently, the picture was presented for 500 ms, followed by a true or false 
sentence, separated by a 50 ms blank screen. Participants were instructed to indicate whether 
the sentence was false, by pressing ‘q’, or true, by pressing ‘p’, on their keyboard. Labels 
were shown at the bottom of the screen to remind participants about the key assignment. The 
sentence stayed on the screen until participants indicated their answer (see Figure 1). Each 














Figure 1: Example of trial sequence in Experiment 1, 2 and 3 (note that in Experiments 2 and 3, the structure of 
the sentence was different; applied to this example, it would be ‘Square is the shape of a tennis ball’.) 
 
2.2. Results 
12.5% of participants reported being non-native English speakers, 3.8% were 
interrupted during the experiment and 33.8% were in the presence of others while performing 
the task. These participants are included in the following analyses. Yet, to investigate whether 
results are affected, we excluded these participants in a separate analysis. Results show that 
the general pattern of effects stays the same. 
We only included trials with reaction times above 300 ms and below 10000 ms (97.92% 
of trials), assuming that correct judgements faster than 300 ms are driven by anticipations 
rather than reflecting validation, and responses slower than 10000 ms might indicate that 
participants were not concentrated on the task in the respective trial. We chose a relatively 
high upper threshold for truncation to account for differences in sentence length and reading 
speed. Data from one participant were incompletely recorded and were not included in the 





2.2.1. Reaction times. We excluded all trials in which sentences were judged incorrectly 
(9.58% of trials). To test whether pre-activating truth-congruent or falsehood-congruent 
concepts influenced the validation latency, we conducted linear mixed-model analyses 
(Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; see also Clark, 1973) using the lme4 package (Bates, 
Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) in the statistical software R Version 3.5.1 for Windows (R 
Core Team, 2018). We report in the following models with the maximal random-effect 
structure that converged (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). For all models, we used 
reference-coding with unrelated primes as reference level for Prime Congruency. That is, we 
compared each level of Prime Congruency to the reference level. The intercept represents the 
cell mean of the unrelated primes. 
We fitted a model including Sentence Validity, Prime Congruency and the two-way 
interaction of Sentence Validity and Prime Congruency as fixed effects. The model featured 
by-subject and by-item random intercepts, as well as a by-subject and by-item random slopes 
for Sentence Validity. The analysis revealed a main effect of Sentence Validity, 2(1) = 9.02, 
p = .003, a main effect of Prime Congruency, 2(2) = 19.57, p < .001, and a two-way 
interaction of Sentence Validity and Prime Congruency, 2(2) = 36.84, p < .001 (see Figure 2, 
left). Simple contrasts were calculated using the R emmeans package based on the R lsmeans 
package (Lenth, 2016). The simple contrast showed that, for true sentences, participants 
judged sentences faster when they were preceded by truth-congruent primes (MEM = 1762.08, 
SE = 73.38) as compared to unrelated primes (MEM = 1851.30, SE = 73.38) and judged 
sentences slower when they were preceded by falsehood-congruent primes (MEM = 1920.32, 
SE = 73.51; see Table 1), compared to unrelated primes. For false sentences, participants 
judged sentences faster when they were preceded by falsehood-congruent primes (MEM = 
1874.02, SE = 69.48) as compared to unrelated primes (MEM = 1957.02, SE = 69.52). There 





and unrelated primes. Thus, truth-congruent primes facilitated judgments for true sentences, 
while falsehood-congruent primes had different effects for true and false sentences: they 
slowed down judgments for true sentences but facilitated judgments for false sentences. 
 
Table 1: Comparisons of estimated marginal means of participants’ reaction times, p-values are adjusted by 
Tukey-method, Experiment 1. 
Contrast Estimate Standard Error p-value 
True Sentences    
Unrelated vs. truth-congruent prime 89.22 23.62 < .001 
Unrelated vs. falsehood-congruent prime -69.02 24.00 .01 
False Sentences    
Unrelated vs. truth-congruent prime 47.32 23.52 .11 




Figure 2: Mean reaction times (left) and accuracy (right) of true/false judgment as a function of Sentence 
Validity and Prime Congruency in Experiment 1. Error bars depict 95% confidence intervals. Circles denote data 






2.2.2. Accuracy. To test whether pre-activating truth- or falsehood-congruent concepts 
influenced validation accuracy, we fitted a model including Sentence Validity, Prime 
Congruency and the two-way interaction of Sentence Validity and Prime Congruency as fixed 
effects with by-subject and by-item random intercepts. The analysis showed a main effect of 
Sentence Validity, 2(1) = 49.12, p < .001, a main effect of Prime Congruency, 2(2) = 25.78, 
p < .001, and a two-way interaction of Sentence Validity and Prime Congruency, 2(2) = 
51.91, p < .001 (see Figure 2, right). The simple contrast showed that, for true sentences, 
participants were less accurate following falsehood-congruent primes (Mprob = .89, SE = .01), 
as compared to unrelated primes (Mprob = .94, SE = .01). There was no difference in accuracy 
between unrelated and truth-congruent primes (Mprob = .93, SE = .01; see Table 2). For false 
sentences, accuracy of judgments did not differ between unrelated (Mprob = .94, SE = .01), 
falsehood-congruent (Mprob = .95, SE = .01) or truth-congruent primes (Mprob = .94, SE = .01; 
see Table 2). Thus, falsehood-congruent primes reduced correct judgments for true sentences, 
but not for false sentences. 
 
Table 2: Comparisons of log odds ratio of participants’ accuracy, p-values are adjusted by Tukey-method, 
Experiment 1. 
Contrast Odds Ratio Standard Error p-value 
True Sentences 
   










False Sentences    











2.2.3. Bayes Factor Analysis. To quantify the evidence for the presence or absence of 





the convention that BF10 = 1 implies no evidence for an effect (i.e., the data are as likely to 
occur under H0 as under H1), 1 < BF10 ≤ 3 implies anecdotal evidence for H1, 3 < BF10 ≤ 10 
implies moderate evidence for H1, 10 < BF10 ≤ 30 implies strong evidence for H1, 30 < BF10 
≤ 100 implies very strong evidence for H1 and BF10 > 100 implies decisive evidence for 
H1(Jeffreys, 1961; Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013). Similarly, .30 < BF10 ≤ 1 implies anecdotal 
evidence for H0, .10 < BF10 ≤ .30 implies moderate evidence for H0, .03 < BF10 ≤ .10 implies 
strong evidence for H0, .01 < BF10 ≤ .03 implies very strong evidence for H0 and BF10 < .01 
implies decisive evidence for H0. 
 
Table 3: Bayes Factors for main effects, interactions and simple comparisons of participants’ reaction times and 













The results of Experiment 1 showed that pre-activating participants’ background 
knowledge facilitates explicit validation: falsehood-congruent primes facilitated validity-
judgments of false sentences and truth-congruent primes facilitated validity-judgements of 
 
Bayes Factors 
Effects and Simple Comparisons Reaction Times Accuracy 
Sentence Validity BF10 = 40.88 BF10 = 56692.93 
Prime Congruency BF10 = 2.05 BF10 = 4.06 
Sentences Validity × Prime Congruency BF10 = 520.71 BF10 = 547675.89 
True sentences   
Unrelated vs. truth-congruent prime BF10 = 4.38 BF10 = .17 
Unrelated vs. falsehood-congruent prime BF10 = .62 BF10 = 3148.05 
False sentences   
Unrelated vs. truth-congruent prime BF10 = .53 BF10 = .18 





true sentences. This result is expected, as it is in line with validation models (e.g., Cook & 
O’Brien, 2014; Richter et al. 2009). Thus, the critical question here is whether activating 
truth-congruent concepts will also facilitate validation processes of false sentences, a 
possibility that can be derived from extant models of validation (e.g., O’Brien & Cook, 2016; 
Richter, 2015; Singer, 2019), but has never been directly tested. Here, the results suggest it 
does not: truth-congruent content did not facilitate validation, demonstrating the importance 
of knowledge about semantic network affiliations rather than knowledge about the true 
concept. 
Yet, the above conclusion might be mitigated by an additional factor that might have 
influenced participants’ reaction times in Experiment 1. In the current design, primes and 
beginning of sentences either created a match (e.g., tracks/trains) or a mismatch 
(highways/trains). Such matches or mismatches occurred in equal proportions for true and 
false sentences, and thus, did not allow participants do use these (mis)matches as a strategy to 
determine the validity of a sentence. Nevertheless, they might have triggered early response 
tendencies that could have affected performance, due to a conflict between the 
match/mismatch between the prime and the first word, and the validity of the sentence. To 
illustrate, when the sentence ‘Trains run on tracks’ is preceded by the prime ‘highway’, a 
mismatch is created between ‘highway’ and ‘trains’, although the actual sentence is true. 
Similarly, when the sentence ‘Trains run on highways’ is preceded by the prime ‘tracks’, a 
conflict might arise between detecting the match between ‘tracks’ and ‘trains’, and the overall 
falsehood of the sentence. Thus, it could be that both these conditions evoke slower reaction 
times than trials where the relations between the prime and the first word accord with the 
overall validity of the sentence. And so, one could argue that truth-congruent primes (here, 
‘tracks’) actually facilitate validation of false sentences, but this effect is masked due to the 
opposite effect evoked by the conflict between the falsehood of the sentence and the 





Hence, the paradigm in Experiment 1 might not have been a fair test for the role of true 
concepts in validation processes. To account for early triggered response tendencies and to 
investigate whether the effects found in Experiment 1 are robust, we changed the structure of 
sentences in Experiment 2. In the new structure, truth-congruent primes would evoke a 
mismatch with the first word of a false sentence, so no conflict should emerge; hence, if truth-
congruent primes indeed facilitate validation processes, there will be no opposite effect that 
would counteract this facilitation. 
 
3. Experiment 2 
To test the reproducibility and robustness of our findings, the words in the sentences 
were now switched, so that concepts that ended the sentences in Experiment 1 were presented 
at the beginning of the sentences (e.g., ‘tracks are the infrastructure trains run on’ for a true 
sentence, and ‘highways are the infrastructure trains run on’ for a false one; see Appendix B). 
Thus, for false sentences, falsehood-congruent primes matched now with the beginning of the 
false sentences (e.g., a picture of a highway and the word ‘highway’) and truth-congruent 
primes mismatched with the beginning of false sentences (e.g., a picture of tracks and the 
word ‘highway’). Accordingly, and differently from Experiment 1, a potential facilitation of 
truth-congruent concepts for false sentences does not require to overcome a reverse response 
tendency. 
3.1. Methods 
3.1.1. Participants and design. We recruited 100 participants (55 female, 41 male, 2 
other, 2 not reported; Mage = 35.30; SDage = 12.84) via Prolific Academic (see Palan, & 
Schitter, 2018; Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, & Acquisti, 2017). Participants could only sign up 
for the experiment if they resided in the United States and were native English speakers. We 
required that they had previously completed at least 50 tests via Prolific Academic and held a 





$2.50) for their participation. The design and post-experimental questionnaire were identical 
to Experiment 1. 
3.1.2. Procedure and Stimuli. The procedure was identical to Experiment 1. However, 
true and false sentences had a different structure as compared to the first experiment. For all 
experimental sentences, the concept that initially ended the sentences, was now mentioned at 
the beginning of each sentence (see Appendix B). The mean number of words per sentence 
was 7.00 (SD = 1.58). All sentences had the same general structure, mentioning the concept 
before the object. This was the case even if the concept was not the first word of the sentence 
(e.g., ‘an example for a fruit is a pear’; sentence in Experiment 1: ‘a pear is a fruit’). The 
mean number of words between prime and concept was .88 (SD = 1.36). The overall meaning 
of the sentences was not changed. 
3.2. Results 
2% of participants reported being non-native English speakers, 1% were interrupted 
during the experiment and 2% were in the presence of others while performing the task. These 
participants are included in the following analyses. To investigate whether results are 
affected, we excluded these participants in a separate analysis. Results show that the general 
pattern of effects stays the same. We only included trials with reaction times above 300 ms 
and below 10000 ms (98.28% of trials). Data from two participants were not recorded. The 
following analyses are based on 98 participants. 
3.2.1. Reaction times. We excluded all trials in which sentences were judged incorrectly 
(7.69% of trials). To test whether pre-activating truth- or falsehood-congruent concepts 
influenced reaction times of validity-judgments when the concept is mentioned at the 
beginning of the sentence, we fitted a model including Sentence Validity, Prime Congruency 
and the two-way interaction of Sentence Validity and Prime Congruency as fixed effects. The 
model featured by-subject and by-item random intercepts, as well as a by-subject and by-item 





Validity, 2(1) = 10.97, p < .001, a main effect for Prime Congruency, 2(2) = 24.57, p < .001, 
and a two-way interaction of Sentence Validity and Prime Congruency, 2(2) = 80.20, p < 
.001 (see Figure 3, left). Simple contrast showed that, for true sentences, the same patterns of 
results as in Experiment 1 was found, so that participants judged sentences faster when they 
were preceded by truth-congruent primes (MEM = 1918.24, SE = 63.68) as compared to 
unrelated primes (MEM = 2021.43, SE = 63.70) and judged sentences slower when they were 
preceded by falsehood-congruent primes (MEM = 2115.27, SE = 63.75; see Table 4). For false 
sentences, as in Experiment 1, only falsehood-congruent primes seemed to affect 
performance: participants judged sentences faster when they were preceded by falsehood-
congruent primes (MEM = 2048.21, SE = 67.83) as compared to unrelated primes (MEM = 
2151.94, SE = 67.81), and there was no difference between truth-congruent primes (MEM = 
2118.09, SE = 67.83) and unrelated primes (see Table 4). Thus, when the content of the prime 
matched the content of the sentence, validity-judgments were faster, irrespective of the 
sentences’ validity (see also Table 6). 
 
Table 4: Comparisons of estimated marginal means of participants’ reaction times, p-values are adjusted by 
Tukey-method, Experiment 2. 
Contrast Estimate Standard Error p-value 
True Sentences    
Unrelated vs. truth-congruent prime 103.19 21.71 < .001 
Unrelated vs. falsehood-congruent prime -93.85 21.96 < .001 
False Sentences    
Unrelated vs. truth-congruent prime 33.85 21.67 .26 









Figure 3: Mean reaction times (left) and accuracy (right) of true/false judgment as a function of Sentence 
Validity and Prime Congruency in Experiment 2. Error bars depict 95% confidence intervals. Circles denote data 
points of individual subjects. Significant contrasts are indicated (** equals p ≤ .001; * equals p < .05). 
 
3.2.2. Accuracy. We fitted a model, including Sentence Validity, Prime Congruency and 
the two-way interaction of Sentence Validity and Prime Congruency as fixed effects with by-
subject and by-item random intercepts. The analysis revealed a main effect of Sentence 
Validity, 2(1) = 13.90, p < .001, a main effect of Prime Congruency, 2(2) = 35.34, p < .001, 
and a two-way interaction of Sentence Validity and Prime Congruency, 2(2) = 21.35, p < 
.001 (see Figure 3, right). The simple contrast showed that, for true sentences, participants 
were less accurate following falsehood-congruent primes (Mprob = .93, SE = .01), as compared 
to unrelated primes (Mprob = .95, SE = .01). There was no difference in accuracy between 
unrelated and truth-congruent primes (Mprob = .96, SE = .004; see Table 5). For false 
sentences, accuracy of judgments for both truth-congruent (Mprob = .95, SE = .01) and 
falsehood-congruent primes (Mprob = .95, SE = .01) was actually lower than for unrelated 





accuracy for both true and false sentences and truth-congruent primes reduced accuracy for 
false sentences (see also Table 6). 
 
Table 5: Comparisons of log odds ratio of participants’ accuracy, p-values are adjusted by Tukey-method, 
Experiment 2. 
Contrast Odds Ratio Standard Error p-value 
True Sentences 
   










False Sentences    












Table 6: Bayes Factors for main effects, interactions and simple comparisons of participants’ reaction times and 

















Effects and Simple Comparisons Reaction Times Accuracy 
Sentence Validity BF10 = 3015.65 BF10 = .75 
Prime Congruency BF10 = .33 BF10 = 18.54 
Sentences Validity × Prime Congruency BF10 = 1.511e+6 BF10 = 6.15 
True sentences   
Unrelated vs. truth-congruent prime BF10 = 129.70 BF10 = .54 
Unrelated vs. falsehood-congruent prime BF10 = 36.97 BF10 = 13.26 
False sentences   
Unrelated vs. truth-congruent prime BF10 = .38 BF10 = 3.53 






Experiment 2 replicated the results of Experiment 1 for reaction times, demonstrating 
their reproducibility and robustness. Truth-congruent primes facilitated judgments for true 
sentences, while falsehood-congruent primes slowed reactions down. Similarly, falsehood-
congruent primes facilitated judgments for false sentences, providing more evidence for the 
role of semantic network affiliations for validation processes. However, the pattern of errors, 
showing that both falsehood-congruent primes and truth-congruent primes reduced accuracy 
for false sentences, is hard to explain. Note that the Bayes factor analysis indicated only 
anecdotal to moderate evidence for reduced accuracy in both cases (BF10 = 3.53 for truth-
congruent primes; BF10 = 2.99 for falsehood-congruent primes). Because the error pattern 
does not fit with neither semantic integration accounts (e.g., Berkum, Hagoort, & Brown, 
1999), nor with models of validation (e.g., O’Brien, & Cook, 2016; Richter et al. 2009), 
Experiment 3 aimed to replicate the results of Experiment 2 to investigate whether found 
effects are genuine or possible false-positives. 
 
4. Experiment 3 
To investigate the replicability of the result pattern in Experiment 2 we ran an exact 
replication of Experiment 2, with a new sample of participants, the same materials, procedure, 
and experimental design.  
4.1. Methods 
4.1.1. Participants and design. One-hundred-and-five undergraduates at the University 
of Hull (81 female, 24 male; Mage = 20.94; SDage = 5.23) participated in an online study on 
‘judgments and visual distraction’ in return for course credit. We limited participation to 
participants who had not participated in Experiment 1. The design, procedure and all materials 







5.7% of participants reported being non-native English speakers, 3.8% were interrupted 
during the experiment and 26.7% were in the presence of others while performing the task. 
These participants are included in the following analyses. To investigate whether results are 
affected, we excluded these participants in a separate analysis. Results show that the general 
pattern of effects stays the same. 
 We only included trials with reaction times above 300 ms and below 10000 ms 
(98.99% of trials). The following analyses are based on 105 participants. 
4.2.1. Reaction times. We excluded all trials in which sentences were judged incorrectly 
(10.30% of trials). We fitted a model including Sentence Validity, Prime Congruency and the 
two-way interaction of Sentence Validity and Prime Congruency as fixed effects. The model 
featured by-subject and by-item random intercepts, as well as a by-subject and by-item 
random slopes for Sentence Validity. The analysis showed a main effect of Sentence Validity, 
2(1) = 12.69, p < .001, a main effect of Prime Congruency, 2(2) = 30.26, p < .001, and a 
two-way interaction of Sentence Validity and Prime Congruency, 2(2) = 111.92, p < .001 
(see Figure 4, left; see also Table 9). Simple contrast showed that, for true sentences, 
participants judged sentences faster when they were preceded by truth-congruent primes (MEM 
= 1892.48, SE = 54.12) as compared to unrelated primes (MEM = 1999.20, SE = 54.15) and 
judged sentences slower when they were preceded by falsehood-congruent primes (MEM = 
2080.24, SE = 54.27; see Table 7). For false sentences, participants judged sentences faster 
when they were preceded by falsehood-congruent primes (MEM = 2004.11, SE = 56.53) as 
compared to unrelated primes (MEM = 2130.60, SE = 56.54). There was no difference between 
truth-congruent primes (MEM = 2092.53, SE = 56.57; see Table 7) and unrelated primes, 








Table 7: Comparisons of estimated marginal means of participants’ reaction times, p-values are adjusted by 
Tukey-method, Experiment 3. 
Contrast Estimate Standard Error p-value 
True Sentences    
Unrelated vs. truth-congruent prime 106.72 19.01 < .001 
Unrelated vs. falsehood-congruent prime -81.04 19.43 < .001 
False Sentences    
Unrelated vs. truth-congruent prime 38.04 18.98  .11 




Figure 4: Mean reaction times (left) and accuracy (right) of true/false judgment as a function of Sentence 
Validity and Prime Congruency in Experiment 3. Error bars depict 95% confidence intervals. Circles denote data 
points of individual subjects. Significant contrasts are indicated (** equals p ≤ .001; * equals p < .05). 
 
4.2.2. Accuracy. We fitted a model including Sentence Validity, Prime Congruency and 
the two-way interaction of Sentence Validity and Prime Congruency as fixed effects with by-





Validity, 2(1) = 65.38, p < .001, a main effect of Prime Congruency, 2(2) = 45.04, p < .001, 
and a two-way interaction of Sentence Validity and Prime Congruency, 2(2) = 100.81, p < 
.001 (see Figure 4, right). The simple contrast showed that, for true sentences, participants 
were less accurate following falsehood-congruent primes (Mprob = .87, SE = .01), as compared 
to unrelated primes (Mprob = .93, SE = .01). There was no difference in accuracy between 
unrelated and truth-congruent primes (Mprob = .94, SE = .01; see Table 8). For false sentences, 
participants were less accurate following truth-congruent primes (Mprob = .93, SE = .01), as 
compared to unrelated primes (Mprob = .94, SE = .01). There was no difference in accuracy 
between unrelated and falsehood-congruent primes (Mprob = .95, SE = .01; see Table 8; see 
also Table 9). 
 
Table 8: Comparisons of log odds ratio of participants’ accuracy, p-values are adjusted by Tukey-method, 
Experiment 3. 
Contrast Odds Ratio Standard Error p-value 
True Sentences 
   










False Sentences    




















Table 9: Bayes Factors for main effects, interactions and simple comparisons of participants’ reaction times and 














Experiment 3 demonstrated again the facilitating effect of pre-activating background 
knowledge on validation performance. As for the differential effects of knowledge types, 
validation was again facilitated by primes that were congruent with the content of the 
sentence, irrespective of sentences’ validity. Replicating the previous experiments, 
Experiment 3 showed that truth-congruent primes only led to facilitation of judging true 
sentences, while falsehood-congruent primes slowed down reaction times for true sentences 
but led to facilitation of judging false sentences. The error pattern of Experiment 3 showed 
that falsehood-congruent primes reduced accuracy for true sentences and truth-congruent 
primes reduced accuracy of false sentences. Thus, in Experiment 3, both the reaction times as 
well as the error pattern suggest that performance was mainly driven by conceptual overlap 
between the primes and the sentences. And, importantly, no facilitative effect for false 
 
Bayes Factors 
Effects and Simple Comparisons Reaction Times Accuracy 
Sentence Validity BF10  = 775758.08 BF10 = 957169.33 
Prime Congruency BF10 = 19.97 BF10 = 1451.24 
Sentences Validity × Prime Congruency BF10 = 8.828e+10 BF10 = 4.410e+12 
True sentences   
Unrelated vs. truth-congruent prime BF10 = 363.95 BF10 = .36 
Unrelated vs. falsehood-congruent prime BF10 = 123.63 BF10 = 5.876e+6 
False sentences   
Unrelated vas. truth-congruent prime BF10 = 1.32 BF10 = 8.66 
Unrelated vs. falsehood-congruent prime BF10 = 181632.93 BF10 = .21 





sentences was found for truth-congruent primes. Taken together, these results imply that 
comprehenders rely on a mismatch detection between the sentence components via activation 
of semantic associations, and do not benefit from the activation of truth-congruent 
information (e.g., Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 2002).  
But is this facilitation unique to information that determines the truth value of the 
sentence, or is it obtained by the activation of any sentence component? In the present study, 
although truth-congruent primes naturally share semantic overlap with both the subjects and 
objects of sentences (e.g., ‘tracks’ share semantic overlap with ‘trains’), they did not seem to 
facilitate comprehension of false sentences (that is, an image of ‘tracks’ did not facilitate 
validity judgments of the sentence ‘highways are the infrastructure trains run on/trains run on 
highways’, compared to the unrelated prime (i.e., an image of a TV test pattern). On the 
contrary, they seemed to cause more judgment errors. Notably, errors were present in 
Experiment 2 and 3 but not in Experiment 1, suggesting that the proximity between prime and 
false concept might be a factor of influence. The error pattern might be explained by a 
conflicting activation of the primed concepts (e.g., ‘tracks’) and the presented concept at the 
beginning of the sentence (e.g. ‘highways’), potentially hampering comprehension. Thus, 
Experiment 4 investigated the relative activation of sentence components by primes that are 
either identical (i.e., sentence-congruent) or associatively related and also truth-related (i.e., 
truth-congruent) with respect to a particular sentence, eliminating influences of conflicting 
activations. 
 
5. Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 had two main goals. The first goal was to investigate the role of relative 
activation of sentence components by sentence-congruent and truth-congruent primes for 
validation. To allow for a meaningful comparison between sentence-congruent and truth-





constant across the two priming conditions for false sentences. Moreover, none of the primes 
created a conflict with the beginning of sentences. The second goal was to explore whether 
the effects found in Experiment 1-3 are unique to picture primes, or evoked by word primes as 
well, suggesting they tap onto a more general mechanism of comprehension. An additional, 
related goal, was to better control for the associations participants might have to the presented 
primes. For example, in Experiment 1-3 we presented a picture of a circle as prime, to activate 
the concept ‘round’ prior to the sentence ‘A tennis ball is square/Square is the shape of a 
tennis ball’. But a circle could also activate other concepts (e.g., circle, ball) rather than the 
exact one we were aiming for. By using words, we were able to directly activate the relevant 
concepts.  
To this end, participants were presented with true and false sentences (e.g., ‘trains run 
on tracks/highways’) and primed either with the subject of the sentence (e.g., ‘trains’; 
sentence-congruent prime) or with the true concept related to a sentence (e.g., ‘tracks’; truth-
congruent prime). For true sentences, we predicted the fastest true judgments for sentence-
congruent primes (identical to the subject of the sentence, associatively related to the true 
concept presented at the end of the sentence), followed by truth-congruent primes (identical to 
the true concept presented at the end of the sentence, associatively related to the subject of 
sentence). Thus, we expected the strongest priming effects for primes identical with sentence 
components and presented in close proximity to the to-be-activated-component. Both types of 
primes should lead to faster reactions as compared to unrelated primes. For false sentences, 
we predicted the fastest false judgments for sentence-congruent primes (identical to the 
subject of the sentence), followed by truth-congruent primes (associatively related to the 







5.1.1. Participants and design. We recruited 100 participants (46 female, 54 male; Mage 
= 34.59; SDage = 12.71) via Prolific Academic (see Palan & Schitter, 2018; Peer et al., 2017). 
Participants could only sign up for the experiment if they resided in the United States and 
were native English speakers. We required that they had previously completed at least 10 tests 
via Prolific Academic and held a record of supplying acceptable data at least 95% of the time. 
They received £1.67 (approx. $2) for their participation. The post-experimental questionnaire 
was identical to previous experiments. The study consisted of a 2 (Sentence Validity: true vs. 
false) × 3 (Prime Congruency: truth-congruent vs. sentence-congruent vs. unrelated) within-
participants design. 
5.1.2. Procedure and Stimuli. The procedure was largely identical to previous 
experiments with the following exceptions: first, none of the sentences contained fictional 
elements, to avoid a potential influence on validation by unrealistic content. Second, we 
ensured that false versions of sentences did not include concepts that are direct opposites of 
the true concepts for the sentence (e.g., ‘Peas are triangular’ instead of ‘Peas are square’; see 
Appendix C). The mean number of words per sentence was 4.07 (SD = 1.07). All sentences 
had the same general structure, mentioning the subject before the concept (similar to 
Experiment 1). The mean number of words between prime and concept was .27 (SD = .44). 
Third, and most importantly, instead of pictures, words were used as primes to reduce 
any ambiguity that might have been caused by metaphorical representations in previous 
experiments. Words were either identical with the subject of the sentence (e.g., ‘peas’ before 
‘peas are round/triangular) or truth-congruent (e.g., ‘round’ before ‘peas are round/triangular). 
Unrelated primes were meaningless letter strings (i.e. ‘xxxx’). Each trial started with a 
warning signal (+++), presented in the center of the screen for 500 ms. Subsequently, a word 
was presented for 200 ms, followed by a true or false sentence, separated by a 50 ms blank 
screen (see Figure 5). The sentence stayed on the screen until participants indicated their 
















Figure 5: Example of trial sequence in Experiment 4 
 
5.2. Results 
2% of participants reported being non-native English speakers and 6% were in the 
presence of others while performing the task. These participants are included in the following 
analyses. To investigate whether results are affected, we excluded these participants in a 
separate analysis. Results show that the general pattern of effects stays the same. We only 
included trials with reaction times above 300 ms and below 10000 ms (99.2% of trials). The 
following analyses are based on 100 participants. 
5.2.1. Reaction times. We excluded all trials in which sentences were judged incorrectly 
(6.9% of trials). To test whether pre-activating truth- and sentence-congruent concepts 
influenced reaction times of validity-judgments, we fitted a model including Sentence 
Validity, Prime Congruency and the two-way interaction of Sentence Validity and Prime 
Congruency as fixed effects. The model featured by-subject and by-item random intercepts, as 
well as a by-subject and by-item random slopes for Sentence Validity. The analysis showed a 





Congruency, 2(2) = 217.67, p < .001, and a two-way interaction of Sentence Validity and 
Prime Congruency, 2(2) = 29.78, p < .001 (see Figure 6, left). Simple contrast showed that 
for true sentences participants judged sentences faster when they were preceded by sentence-
congruent primes (MEM = 1299.03, SE = 48.25) and by truth-congruent primes (MEM = 
1391.29, SE = 48.26) as compared to unrelated primes (MEM = 1470.30, SE = 48.26). As 
predicted, sentence-congruent primes led to more facilitation compared to truth-congruent 
primes (see Table 10). For false sentences, participants judged sentences faster when they 
were preceded by sentence-congruent primes (MEM = 1407.60, SE = 51.20) as compared to 
unrelated primes (MEM = 1574.39, SE = 51.20). Contrary to our prediction, truth-congruent 
primes (MEM = 1615.95, SE = 51.17) did not lead to facilitation. On the contrary, they showed 
the tendency to slow down reactions compared to unrelated primes (see Table 10). Thus, 
sentence-congruent primes facilitated reactions for both true and false sentences, while truth-
congruent-primes only facilitated the judgment of true sentences (see also Table 12). 
 
Table 10: Comparisons of estimated marginal means of participants’ reaction times, p-values are adjusted by 
Tukey-method, Experiment 4. 
Contrast Estimate Standard Error p-value 
True Sentences    
Unrelated vs. sentence-congruent prime 171.27 17.89 < .001 
Unrelated vs. truth-congruent prime 79.01 17.73 < .001 
Sentence-congruent vs. truth-congruent -92.26 17.69 < .001 
False Sentences    
Unrelated vs. sentence-congruent prime 166.79 17.78 < .001 










Figure 6: Mean reaction times (left) and accuracy (right) of true/false judgment as a function of Sentence 
Validity and Prime Congruency in Experiment 4. Error bars depict 95% confidence intervals. Circles denote data 
points of individual subjects. Significant contrasts are indicated (** equals p ≤ .001; * equals p < .05). 
 
5.2.2. Accuracy. We fitted a model including Sentence Validity, Prime Congruency and 
the two-way interaction of Sentence Validity and Prime Congruency as fixed effects with by-
subject and by-item random intercepts. The analysis revealed a marginally significant main 
effect of Sentence Validity, 2(1) = 3.56, p = .059, and a two-way interaction of Sentence 
Validity and Prime Congruency, 2(2) = 8.28, p = .016 (see Figure 6, right). The simple 
contrast showed that, for true sentences, participants’ accuracy did not differ following 
sentence-congruent primes (Mprob = .97, SE = .004), truth-congruent primes (Mprob = .96, SE = 
.004) or unrelated primes (Mprob = .96, SE = .004; see Table 11). Also for false sentences, 
accuracy did not differ following sentence-congruent primes (Mprob = .96, SE = .005) and 
truth-congruent primes (Mprob = .96, SE = .004) compared to unrelated primes (Mprob = .96, SE 









Table 11: Comparisons of log odds ratio of participants’ accuracy, p-values are adjusted by Tukey-method, 
Experiment 4. 
Contrast Odds Ratio Standard Error p-value 
True Sentences 
   










False Sentences    












Table 12: Bayes Factors for main effects, interactions and simple comparisons of participants’ reaction times and 

















Effects and Simple Comparisons Reaction Times Accuracy 
Sentence Validity BF10  = 1.585e+24 BF10 = .13 
Prime Congruency BF10 = 6.547e+20 BF10 = .03 
Sentences Validity × Prime Congruency BF10 = 3190.89 BF10 = .28 
True sentences   
Unrelated vs. sentence-congruent prime BF10 = 6.576e+12 BF10 = .61 
Unrelated vs. truth-congruent prime BF10 = 411.87 BF10 = .15 
Sentence-congruent vs. truth-congruent BF10 = 216.82  
False sentences   
Unrelated vas. sentence-congruent prime BF10 = 4.047e+9 BF10 = .16 
Unrelated vs. truth-congruent prime BF10 = 2.94 BF10 = .73 






Experiment 4 demonstrated that activating content that is part of true and false 
sentences facilitates validity-judgments. This finding is in line with the assumption that 
validation relies on knowledge about semantic network affiliations. Interestingly, and 
differently from our prediction, truth-congruent primes tended to interfere with validity-
judgments for false sentences, despite the semantic overlap with the subject of a sentence. 
Even if this marginally significant (and close to conclusive) result is not true, it is clear that 
truth-congruent primes did not facilitate validation. This is surprising, as it does not only go 
against the claim that activation of background knowledge aids validation; it is also 
incompatible with the widely-accepted claim that priming a semantically related concept (e.g., 
‘tracks’ for ‘trains’) facilitates sentence comprehension (cf. Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; 
Neely, 1977; Posner & Snyder, 1975). Arguably, the conflict between the truth-congruent 
concept and the last word of the sentence that makes it false (e.g., ‘highways’) could have 
overshadowed the initial facilitation of the first word, that is expected given previous 
literature. Thus, it seems like activating truth-congruent concepts might even tamper with 
validation processes, given the evoked conflict with the actual content of the sentence. 
Notably, the latter finding further demonstrates that although the relations between the 
prime and the subject of the sentence strongly affect participants’ performance (hence, the 
greater facilitation of processing true sentences following a prime that is identical to the first 
rather than last word), they do not fully explain participants’ behavior. Indeed, although truth-
congruent primes were naturally well-associated with the subject of the sentence, their 
conflict with the last word abolished their facilitative effect. Thus, a pre-activation of the 
subject of the sentence was not the sole factor affecting validity-judgments.  
 





The aim of the present study was to assess the effect of knowledge pre-activation on 
validation processes and to investigate whether different types of knowledge exert a different 
effect on these processes. While it seems beyond debate that existing knowledge plays an 
important role for validation processes (Singer, 2019), the effects of pre-activating such 
knowledge on explicit validation processes have not been tested. In addition, it seems less 
clear whether people need to compare presented information with the correct answer (i.e., true 
concept) to determine that a sentence is false, or whether they rely on a mismatch between 
presented sentence components (i.e., detect semantic network affiliation) in order to spot 
falsehood. The results of our study support the latter interpretation, showing no facilitation of 
validation processes (and perhaps even a negative effect) for activated true concepts. 
We pre-activated participants’ knowledge by priming concepts that are either congruent 
with true concepts, congruent with false concepts or congruent with specific components of 
the sentences and measured speed and accuracy of validity-judgments. The results of 
Experiment 1 suggested that truth-congruent primes speed up validation of true sentences and 
falsehood-congruent primes speed up validation of false sentences. Thus, the results of 
Experiment 1 suggest that validation is carried out on the basis of knowledge about semantic 
network affiliation. Experiment 2 used a different sentence structure, with concepts presented 
at the beginning rather than the end of sentences, and replicated the result pattern of 
Experiment 1, corroborating the robustness of the effect. Yet, the error pattern in Experiment 
2 was neither in line with semantic integration accounts (e.g., Berkum, Hagoort, & Brown, 
1999), nor with models of validation (e.g., O’Brien, & Cook, 2016; Richter et al. 2009). 
Surprisingly, for false sentences, participants made more errors following both truth-
congruent and falsehood-congruent primes. Importantly, however, this surprising effect was 
not replicated in Experiment 3, suggesting that it might have been a false-positive result. In 
Experiment 3, truth-congruent primes again led to facilitation of true judgments and 





from Experiment 1 and 2. Moreover, the error pattern showed that falsehood-congruent 
primes reduced accuracy for true sentences and truth-congruent primes reduced accuracy of 
false sentences. The facilitation effects and the error pattern of congruent primes (falsehood-
congruent for false sentences and truth-congruent for true sentences) clearly imply that 
validation can be carried out with minimal semantic processing that is just good enough to 
detect semantic network affiliation (Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 2002). 
Finally, Experiment 4 showed that activating a specific component of true and false 
sentences facilitates validity-judgments, but to a different degree. Importantly, and contrary to 
our expectations, pre-activating truth-congruent concepts did not facilitate falsehood-
judgments, despite being semantically or associatively related to the subject of the sentence. 
To illustrate, we expected that pre-activating ‘tracks’ will activate ‘train’ to some degree. 
However, the results of Experiment 4 suggest that such activation is not sufficient to speed up 
the validation of false sentences, and might even tamper with the process, showing a 
marginally significant decrease of performance for truth-congruent primes. Speculatively, this 
lack of facilitation (and possible semantic interference) following truth-congruent primes 
stems from the conflict between these prime and the actual content of the false sentence (e.g., 
Piai, Roelofs, & van der Meij, 2012).     
Taken together, our results strongly support the claim that validation can be carried out 
with minimal semantic processing that is just good enough to detect a lack of semantic 
overlap, or a mismatch, between sentence components, and does not benefit from pre-
activating the specific true concept for a false sentence (see Figure 7). Activating content-
congruent concepts facilitated validation for true and false sentences. Moreover, activating 
incongruent concepts led to more errors in judging the validity of true and false sentences. 
Thus, background knowledge needs not involve the activation of the true content of the 
sentence, but rather simply the association of the sentence’s content to a specific sematic 





category of berries does not include macadamia’ for validation to take place. Knowing that 
‘macademia are nuts’ does not seem to help validation, and might even interfere with it. 
Under this account, when encountered by the sentence ‘macadamia are berries’, the validation 
process only entails activating the two concepts (i.e., ‘macadamia’ and ‘berries’), and 
detecting the lack of overlap in features (in terms of distributed models; see Masson, 1995; 
Moss, Hare, Day, & Tyler, 1994), or the lack of connection between the units (in line with 
spreading activation models; Anderson, 1983; Collins & Loftus, 1975). And so, pre-activating 
‘berries’ or ‘macadamia’ facilitates the validation process, as one of the two critical 
components of the sentence has already been activated, and the search for a match and 













Figure 7: Schematic overview of the validation mechanism suggested by the results. 
 
Within this framework, our findings imply that background knowledge has an essential 
role in the validation process, in line with contemporary models of validation (Cook & 





(O’Brien, & Cook, 2016) postulates a validation stage, in which active linked components in 
short-term memory are validated against contents from long-term memory by a pattern-
matching process. Our findings suggest that the relevant knowledge that is required for this 
stage is that linked sentence components cannot be integrated, rather than retrieving the 
correct answer from long-term memory. That is, rather than detecting the mismatch between 
the active link ‘macadamia – berries’ and the link from long-term memory ‘macadamia – 
nuts,’ the mismatch between ‘macadamia’ and ‘berries’ is detected. Accordingly, determining 
the relations between a sentences’ components may be done in a low-level manner, relying on 
statistical co-occurrences and category matching (Pulvermüller, 2013) not on expected 
content. 
This interpretation is also in line with the Good-Enough Representations approach in 
language processing (Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 2002). This approach suggests that semantic 
representations might be just good enough to process and comprehend information, depending 
on the task that a comprehender has to perform. Arguably, comprehenders do not always 
engage in complete and detailed processing of the sentence, which only occurs when needed.  
And so, activating content-congruent concepts might just be enough for validation. Yet, if 
validity of a sentence cannot be determined due to semantic network affiliation (e.g., 
Erickson, & Mattson, 1981; Sanford, 2002) validation might require a different strategy (e.g., 
Cook, Walsh, Bills, Kircher, & O’Brien, 2016) and speculatively, the activation of true 
concepts might be helpful under such circumstances. 
How do our findings relate to accounts assuming that validation is influenced by the 
perceived fluency of information processing (e.g., Reber & Schwarz, 1999)? Experienced 
ease of processing (i.e. fluency) is typically associated with truth (see Unkelbach, 2007), so 
that when the processing of information is experienced as fluent, it might be judged as true 
even if it is not (see Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012). Accordingly, 





lead to the judgment that a sentence is true. On the other hand, if incongruent content is 
activated, it should interfere with sentence processing, given the resulting conflict. This then 
decreases perceived fluency and may lead to the judgment that the sentence is false (see 
Newman et al., 2015; cf. Hansen, Dechene, & Wänke, 2008). Our results, however, suggest 
that greater fluency, which presumably follows the activation of a content-congruent prime, 
might possibly lead not only to faster true but also faster false judgments, as opposed to the 
above approach. A possible explanation to this apparent contradiction might lie in the fact that 
our sentences were easy to validate (i.e., they were clearly false/true), while fluency is 
assumed to influence judgments under uncertainty (e.g., Jacoby & Kelley, 1987; Zajonc, 
1968; see also Loersch & Payne, 2011), that is, when background knowledge is not available 
or less accessible, which was not the case in our experiments.  
A similar argument can be made with respect to the finding that the error pattern we 
obtained stemmed from incongruent primes reducing accuracy of judgments (compared to 
unrelated primes), rather than from congruent primes improving accuracy of judgments. This 
again may have to do with the fact that we used sentences that were easy to validate, 
suggesting a potential ceiling-effect, leaving not much room for improvement. In a way, this 
echoes the finding that incongruent scene-context hinders performance but congruent one 
does not improve it, compared with a ‘no context’ condition (Davenport & Potter, 2004). Yet, 
when using ambiguous, hard to detect objects, contextual facilitation by congruent objects is 
found (Brandman & Peelen, 2017). Future research is needed to better clarify this point. 
Three alternative explanations of our results should be considered. First, a potential 
worry in priming experiments is that primes did not activate concepts to the same degree 
across conditions (e.g., in our case, the relation between ‘stopwatch’ and ‘fast’ might be 
stronger/weaker than the relation between ‘hourglass’ and ‘slow’). Yet, this concern is not 
applicable to our design, because a single nominal prime appeared before four nominal 





‘Cheetahs run slow’ and before ‘Turtles move slow’ and ‘Turtles move fast’; counterbalanced 
across participants,). Thus, each nominal prime could either serve as a congruent or an 
incongruent prime, across participants. Still, as some primes did not refer to literal but 
metaphorical representations, such metaphorical primes might have induced weaker priming 
effects across conditions. However, excluding these metaphorical primes did not change the 
pattern of results. Importantly, all of these concerns are addressed by the use of words in 
Experiment 4, hereby making the primes less open to interpretation. 
A second alternative explanation concerns the fact that for Experiments 1-3, out of 240 
sentences used in our experiments, six contained information related to unreal or fictional 
events (see Appendix A and B). Thus, the inclusion of these sentences might have influenced 
general processing tendencies that might have affected the results in our study. For example, 
in a fictional world, turtles might be fast, thus activating the concept ‘fast’ might be 
considered activating a truth-congruent rather than a falsehood-congruent concept. Yet, this 
would imply that participants tended to judge false sentences as true. Performance for 
fictional sentences was not different than for the other, non-fictional ones (90.7% overall 
accuracy for fictional sentences and 90.8% for non-fictional ones). Moreover, the fictional 
sentences referred to well-known fictional facts (e.g., Santa Claus brings presents on 
Christmas), thus answering them correctly required access to general fictional knowledge, 
whereas imaging the possibility that there might be fast turtles in a fictional world, might 
involve different cognitive mechanisms. And, perhaps most convincingly, these sentences 
were not included in Experiment 4 (see Appendix C). Nevertheless, future research should 
investigate whether an unrealistic context in particular (Rapp, Hinze, Slaten, & Horton, 2014) 
or putting participants in a certain mindset in general (e.g., Mayo, 2015; Schul, Mayo, & 
Burnstein, 2004) might moderate the present findings. 
A third alternative explanation for our findings should be considered with respect to 





processing (e.g., Connell & Keane, 2006; Gilbert, 1991). Connell and Keane (2006) propose a 
two-step process in which incoming information is first comprehended by mentally 
representing the information together with related prior knowledge in a comprehension stage. 
Then, at the second stage the information is evaluated by comparing whether activated mental 
representations fit with prior knowledge in an assessment stage. To the extent that 
comprehension and validation form two separate stages of information processing, our results 
might simply reflect lexical activation and thus, facilitate comprehension, rather than 
validation. And so, because priming sentence congruent content facilitates comprehension, the 
subsequent stage of validation can also be carried out faster. We, on the other hand, derived 
our hypotheses from the theory that validation is a by-product of comprehension, which 
seems more parsimonious (Cook & O’Brien, 2014; O’Brien & Cook, 2016; Richter, 2015; 
Singer, 2013). That is, co-activated prior knowledge, necessary to comprehend incoming 
information, is simultaneously used to validate this information (Richter, 2015). Yet, we 
acknowledge that our experiments and results alone do not allow to determine whether the 
pre-activation of sentence-congruent content aids validation directly (i.e., validation as by-
product of comprehension) or indirectly (i.e., comprehension followed by validation). Future 
studies should address this question by comparing the facilitating effect of sentence-congruent 
primes between a validation task (i.e., determining the truth-value of sentences) and a 
comprehension task (i.e., asking questions about sentence content; see Isberner & Richter, 
2014). No differences in reaction times between the two tasks should be predicted if 
validation happens as a by-product of comprehension, but reaction times for the 
comprehension task should be faster if validation follows comprehension. 
A final concern relates to the generalizability of our findings to everyday validation 
procedures. Our paradigm required participants to explicitly judge the validity of sentences 
(while in reality individuals are typically not explicitly asked to judge whether information is 





more likely and so participants might try to optimize strategies to complete the task as fast 
and accurate as possible. Accordingly, participants were more likely to use knowledge about 
semantic network affiliation in our study while they might be more likely to use true concepts 
under different conditions (see Richter & Maier, 2017). Our present findings cannot rule out 
this possibility and future research should investigate under which conditions people rely on a 
mismatch detection between sentence components and under which conditions they use true 
concepts to validate information. Still, our findings clearly show that validation can be carried 
out only on the basis of detection of lack of semantic overlap between sentence components 
and does not need to involve the activation of true concepts. Evidently, a precondition for 
validation based on knowledge about semantic network affiliation is that this criterion is 
sufficient to detect a mismatch between sentence components (as was the case for the 
sentences used in our paradigm). Thus, our findings are generalizable to information for 
which this is the case. Yet, speculatively, information for which this is not the case (e.g., 
‘cows drink milk’) might require different validation processes. 
How do our findings inform previous research that demonstrated the error-proneness of 
validation processes and their effect on memory (for an overview, see Rapp & Braasch, 
2014)? The surprising finding that people rely on inaccurate information despite knowing that 
the information is false (e.g., Eslick, Fazio, & Marsh, 2011; Fazio, Barber, Rajaram, Ornstein, 
& Marsh, 2013; Marsh & Fazio, 2006; Marsh, Meade, & Roediger, 2003), might be explained 
by decreased activation of truth-congruent concepts and increased activation of falsehood-
congruent concepts. If people indeed do not access the correct answer while detecting 
falsehood, correct knowledge cannot compete with the memory trace that might be left by 
false information. Accordingly, this trace might increase reliance on false information (see 
Rapp, 2016; Rapp, Hinze, Kohlhepp, & Ryskin, 2014). Our present findings imply that 
validation can be carried out on the basis of knowledge about semantic network affiliation. 





strongest activation, while true knowledge is weaker or not activated at all. Consequently, 
strongly activated components have a high likelihood to be encoded in memory and lead to 
false information being remembered despite being detected as false (Weil, Schul & Mayo, 
2019).  
6. Conclusion 
The present study demonstrates that during validation of false sentences, people do not 
benefit from access to the correct answer. It might be enough to know that something is not 
the case in order to detect falsehood. And so, when confronted with a false sentence, like 
‘macadamia are berries’, one would not benefit from being reminded that macadamia are nuts. 
On the contrary, our findings imply that bringing the truth to mind (i.e., activating truth-
congruent concepts) before being confronted with falsehood might even be detrimental, 
leading to errors in judgments and possibly slower judgment times. The findings might also 
shed fresh light on previous findings that demonstrated the error-proneness of validation 
processes and their effect on memory: the detection of falsehood does not require bringing the 
truth to mind. Thus, even if false information is identified as false, in the absence of a 
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Overview of true versions of sentences used in Experiment 1. False versions were created 
by switching the last word (highlighted) of Set A and Set B for each corresponding sentence. 
Set A Set B 
The sun rises in the east. The sun sets in the west. 
Turtles move slow. Cheetahs run fast. 
Giraffes are tall. Dwarfs are short. 
A forest consists of trees. On the beach, kids build castles out of sand. 
Scissors are used to cut. Glue is used to paste. 
England is a country. Berlin is a city. 
Boats sail on water. Horses run on land. 
Shorts are worn in summer. Gloves are worn in winter. 
Sugar is sweet. Beer is bitter. 
Lemons are sour. Potato chips are salty. 
The Arctic is cold. A fire is hot. 
Fish have scales. Humans have pores. 
Birds have feathers. Dogs have fur. 
Wine is liquid. Walls are solid. 
Soap makes you clean. Grease makes you dirty. 
Towels are used to get dry. Rain makes you wet. 
Cars have wheels. Gazelles have legs. 
Easter eggs are hidden by bunnies. Roosters are male chicken. 
The Statue of Liberty is in New York. The Eiffel tower is in Paris. 
John Lennon demonstrated for peace. In 1939 the world was at war. 
You should cross the road when your traffic light is green. Blood is red. 
Flashlights are bright. When you switch off the light it is dark. 
Elephants are big. Ants are small. 
Airplanes fly in the sky. Cars drive on the street. 
Snow is white. A panther is black. 
Rocks are hard. Silk is soft. 
Jumbo jets are heavy. Feathers are light. 
A pear is a fruit. Broccoli is a vegetable. 
Baked beans is a dish. Lemonade is a drink. 
Diamonds are expensive. Discounters are cheap. 
Owls are active during the night. Kids go to school during the day. 
Peas are round. A TV screen is square. 
A year has 12 months. A day has 24 hours. 
Magazines are made from paper. Clothes are made from textile. 
You lock a door with a key. You cut bread with a knife. 
During a theatre performance the audience should be silent. Rock concerts are loud. 
The lowest story of a building is the basement. If you take the stairs up you reach the attic. 
Cake is baked in the oven. Ice cream is kept in the fridge. 
Fever, coughing and a running nose are signs that you are sick. You leave the hospital when you are healthy. 
Winning the lottery is rare. Preferring holidays over workdays is common. 
Trains run on tracks. Buses run on highways. 





Most people´s dominant hand is right. In Britain people drive on the left. 
You need to charge your battery when it is empty. The bath tub is overflowing when it is full. 
Texas lies in the south. Alaska lies in the north. 
A chair is a piece of furniture. A sweater is a piece of clothing. 
Alligators are reptiles. Wolves are mammals. 
An eye of a needle is narrow. A baseball field is wide. 
The currency in the USA is dollar. The currency in Russia is ruble. 
Dogs wag their tails. Left and right from its nose, a cat has whiskers. 
Health, luck and enough money makes people happy. The death of a dear one makes people sad. 
Breakfast is eaten in the morning. Dinner is eaten in the evening. 
Soup is eaten with a spoon. Salad is eaten with a fork. 
You enter your house through the door. To let air inside the car while driving, you open the window. 
People lie down to sleep in the bedroom. Dinner is cooked in the kitchen. 
You chew with your teeth. The doctor says: 'Stick out your tongue!' 
People drink coffee from a cup. You fry a steak in a pan. 
Scarves are worn around the neck. Watches are worn around the wrist. 
Shoes are worn on feet. Wedding rings are worn on the left hand. 
Tom Hanks is an actor. Bob Marley was a singer. 
Tuna is sold in cans. Water is sold in bottles. 
Four is a number. Y is a letter. 
Tigers have paws. Children have hands. 
Moles live underground. Squirrels live on trees. 
Violins have strings. Accordions have keyboards. 
Scrapers are DIY tools. Harps are musical instruments. 
Ostriches are bipeds. Horses are quadrupeds. 
Macadamia are nuts. Black currants are berries. 
A tennis ball is round. Dice are square. 
A cow gives milk. If you squeeze oranges you get juice. 
Kids play 'trick or treat' on Halloween. Santa Claus brings presents on Christmas. 
Roses have thorns. Hedgehogs have stings. 
Bees live in hives. Bears live in caves. 
Rye belongs to the family of grains. Seaweed belongs to the family of algae. 
You smell with your nose. You hear with your ears. 
Japan is in Asia. The Netherlands are in Europe. 
In a garage people fix vehicles. With clay and a potter's wheel you create pottery. 
The USA is a democracy. Saudi Arabia is a monarchy. 
Van Gogh was a painter. Shakespeare was a poet. 
Johnnie Walker is a brand of whiskey. Pepsi is a brand of soda. 
Cabernet Sauvignon is a name for wine. Absolut and Smirnoff are brands of vodka. 
Pregnancy happens in the bodies of women. Beard growth is a sign of puberty in men. 
The sky is blue. Corn is yellow. 
Neil Armstrong flew to the moon. The red planet is Mars. 
Barcelona is in Spain. Hamburg is in Germany. 
Rolex produces watches. Macs from Apple are computers. 
You close a jacket with a zipper. You open a door with a handle. 
Louis Armstrong played the trumpet. Jimi Hendrix played the guitar. 
A witch rides her flying broom. Aladdin rides the magic carpet. 





Orangutans are primates. Beavers are rodents. 
Kobe Bryant is a basketball player. Cristiano Ronaldo is a soccer player. 
A sandbox is a playground for children. Consumption of alcohol is allowed only for adults. 
The alphabet consists of letters. A fraction consists of numbers. 
A birth date consists of numbers. Words consist of letters. 
Cobras are snakes. Tarantulas are spiders. 
A black widow is a spider. A boa constrictor is a snake. 
Lipsticks are cosmetics. Paper clips are stationery. 
Chips are made from potatoes. Ketchup is made from tomatoes. 
Mirrors are made from glass. A trunk consists of wood. 
Beech is a wood. Steel is a metal. 
Salami is a sausage. Cheddar is a cheese. 
A shower can be found in the bathroom. A sofa can be found in the living room. 
Brooms are used to sweep the floor. Lamps hang from the ceiling. 
A pregnancy takes 9 months. An hour has 60 minutes. 
Candles work with fire. A light bulb works with electricity. 
Sunglasses protect your eyes. Sunscreen protects your skin. 
Coffee is made from beans. Risotto is made from rice. 
Sheep live on land. Fish live in water. 
Hamsters have fur. Eagles have feathers. 
Mud makes you dirty. Shower gel makes you clean. 
Swimming makes you wet. Umbrellas keep you dry. 
Balloons are light. Tankships are heavy. 
A cucumber is a vegetable. A peach is a fruit. 
Pants are made from textile. Letters are written on paper. 
You cut wood with a saw. You put a nail in the wall with a hammer. 
You warm food in the microwave. Ice cubes are kept in the freezer. 
A day ends in the evening. A day starts in the morning. 
You leave the house in shoes. You go to sleep barefoot. 










Overview of true versions of sentences used in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3. False 
versions were created by switching the last word (highlighted) of Set A and Set B for each 
corresponding sentence. 
Set A Set B 
East is where the sun rises. West is where the sun sets. 
A slow animal is a turtle. Fast animals are cheetahs. 
A tall animal is a giraffe. Short describes the height of dwarfs. 
Trees constitute a forest. Sand is used by kids to build castles on the beach. 
Cutting is done with scissors. Pasting is done with glue. 
One of the countries in the world is England. An example for a city is Berlin. 
Water is the element boats sail on. Earth is the element horses run on. 
In the summer people wear shorts. In the winter people wear gloves. 
Sweet is the taste of sugar. Bitter is the taste of beer. 
Sour is the taste of lemons. Salty is the taste of potato chips. 
Cold is the temperature in the Arctic. Hot is the temperature of fire. 
Scales cover the bodies of fish. Pores can be found on the bodies of humans. 
Feathers cover the bodies of birds. Fur covers the bodies of dogs. 
Liquid is the physical condition of wine. Solid is the physical condition of walls. 
Clean is what soap makes you. Dirty is what grease makes you. 
Dry is what you are after using a towel. Wet is what you are after being in the rain. 
Wheels are parts of a car. Legs are parts of gazelles. 
Bunnies hide Easter eggs. Chicken are called roosters when they are male. 
New York is the location of the Statue of Liberty. Paris is the location of the Eiffeltower. 
Peace was what John Lennon demonstrated for. War reigned the world in 1939. 
Green traffic lights signal you to cross the road. Red is the color of blood. 
Bright is a quality of flashlights. It is dark when you switch off the light. 
Big describes the size of elephants. Small describes the size of ants. 
The sky is where airplanes fly. Streets are places where cars drive. 
White is the color of snow. Black is the color of a panther. 
Hard is a feature of rocks. Soft is a quality of silk. 
Heavy describes the weight of jumbo jets. Light describes the weight of feathers. 
An example for a fruit is a pear. An example for a vegetable is broccoli. 
An example for a dish is baked beans. An example for a drink is lemonade. 
Expensive is the price of diamonds. Cheap is what discounters are. 
At night time owls are active. The day is the time when kids go to school. 
Round describes the shape of peas. Square describes the shape of a TV screen. 
Twelve months constitute a year. Twenty-four hours constitute a day. 
Paper is the material magazines are made of. Textile is the material clothes are made of. 





Silent is what the audience should be during a theatre performance. Loud is what rock concerts are. 
The basement is the lowest story of a building. The attic can be reached by taking the stairs up. 
An oven is used to bake cake. A fridge is a place to keep ice cream. 
Sickness is indicated by fever, coughing and a running nose. Health means you can leave the hospital. 
It is rare to win the lottery. It is common to prefer holidays over workdays. 
Tracks are the infrastructure trains run on. Highways are the infrastructure buses run on. 
Bees make honey. Butterflies develop from caterpillars. 
Right is the side of most people´s dominant hand. Left is the side that people in Britain drive on. 
Empty means you need to charge your battery. Full is when the bath tub is overflowing. 
The south is where Texas lies. The north is where Alaska lies. 
An example for furniture is a chair. An example for clothing is a sweater. 
An example for a reptile is an alligator. An example for a mammal is a wolf. 
Narrow describes the eye of a needle. Wide describes the dimension of a baseball field. 
Dollar is the currency in the USA. Ruble is the currency in Russia. 
Tails are wagged by dogs. Whiskers are left and right from a cat's nose. 
Happiness results from health, luck and enough money. Sadness results from the death of a dear one. 
In the morning people eat breakfast. In the evening people eat dinner. 
Spoons are used to eat soup. Forks are used to eat salad. 
The door is the place where you enter your house. The window can be opened to let air inside the car while driving. 
The bedroom is the place where people lie down to sleep. The kitchen is the place where dinner is cooked. 
Teeth are used to chew. Your tongue is coated when you are ill. 
A cup is used to drink coffee. A pan is used to fry a steak. 
The neck is the bodypart where scarfs are worn. The wrist is the bodypart where watches are worn. 
Feet are the bodyparts where shoes are worn. Hands are the bodyparts where wedding rings are worn. 
An example for an actor is Tom Hanks. An example for a singer is Bob Marley. 
Cans are used to sell tuna. Bottles are used to sell water. 
An example for a number is 4. An example for a letter is Y. 
Paws are body parts of tigers. Hands are bodyparts of children. 
Underground is where moles live. Trees are where squirrels live. 
Strings are parts of violins. Keyboards are parts of accordions. 
An example for a DIY tool is a scraper. An example for a musical instrument is a harp. 
An example for a biped is an ostrich. An example for a quadruped is a horse. 
An example for nuts are macadamia. An example for berries are black currants. 
Round is the shape of a tennis ball. Square is the shape of a dice. 
Milk is what a cow gives. Juice is what you get when you squeeze oranges. 
Halloween is when kids play 'trick or treat'. Christmas is the time when Santa Claus brings presents. 
Thorns are parts of roses. Stings cover the bodies of hedgehogs. 
Hives are places where bees live. Caves are places where bears live. 
A grain type is rye. An algae type is seaweed. 
Noses are used to smell. Ears are used to hear. 
In Asia you can find Japan. In Europe you can find the Netherlands. 
Vehicles are fixed in a garage. Pottery is created with clay and a potter's wheel. 





An example for a painter is Van Gogh. An example for a poet is Shakespeare. 
A whiskey brand is Johnnie Walker. A soda brand is Pepsi. 
A wine name is Cabernet Sauvignon. Vodka brands are Absolut and Smirnoff. 
Women can become pregnant. Men start having a beard at puberty. 
Blue is the color of the sky. Yellow is the color of corn. 
The moon was visited by Neil Armstrong. Mars is the red planet. 
In Spain you can find Barcelona. In Germany you can find Hamburg. 
Watches are produced by Rolex. An example for a computer is a Mac from Apple. 
A zipper is used to close a jacket. A handle is used to open a door. 
The trumpet was played by Louis Armstrong. The guitar was played by Jimi Hendrix. 
A broom is used by a witch to fly. A carpet is the magic ride of Aladdin. 
A pumpkin turned into Cinderella’s carriage. Spinach is Popeye's food for strength. 
An example for a primate is an orangutan. An example for a rodent is a beaver. 
A well-known basketball player is Kobe Bryant. A well-known soccer player is Cristiano Ronaldo. 
Children use sandboxes as playgrounds. Adults are allowed to consume alcohol. 
Letters constitute the alphabet. Digits are part of a fraction. 
Digits are used to denote one's birth date. Letters are part of a word. 
An example for a snake is a cobra. An example for a spider is a tarantula. 
An example for a spider is a black widow. An example for a snake is a boa constrictor. 
An example for cosmetics are lipsticks. An example for stationery are paper clips. 
Potatoes are used to make chips. Tomatoes are used to make ketchup. 
Glass is used to make mirrors. Wood is what a toothpick consists of. 
An example for wood is beech. An example for metal is steel. 
An example for sausage is pepperoni. An example for cheese is cheddar. 
The bathroom is the place where a shower can be found. The living room is the place where a sofa can be found. 
Floors are swept with brooms. The ceiling is the place lamps hang from. 
Nine months is the duration of a pregnancy. Sixty minutes constitute an hour. 
Fire is used to light candles. Electricity is what makes a light bulb work. 
Eyes can be protected by sunglasses. Skin can be protected by sunscreen. 
Beans are what coffee is made from. Rice is the main ingredient of risotto. 
Earth is the element sheep live on. Water is the element fish live in. 
Fur covers the bodies of hamsters. Feathers cover the bodies of eagles. 
Dirty is what mud makes you. Clean is what you are after using shower gel. 
Wet is what you are after swimming. Dry is what you stay with an umbrella. 
Light describes the weight of balloons. Heavy describes the weight of tankships. 
An example for a vegetable is a cucumber. An example for a fruit is a peach. 
Textile is the material pants are made of. Paper is used to write letters. 
A saw is used to cut wood. Hammers are used to put nails in the wall. 
A microwave is used to warm food. The freezer is a place to keep ice cubes. 
The evening is the end of a day. The morning is the beginning of a day. 
In shoes is how you leave the house. Barefoot is how you go to sleep. 







Overview of true versions of sentences used in Experiment 4. False versions were created 
by switching the last word (highlighted) of Set A and Set B for each corresponding sentence. 
Set A Set B 
Bulls are male cows. Roosters are male chicken. 
Halloween is in October. Christmas is in December. 
Lemons are sour. Chips are salty. 
Macadamia are nuts. Grapes are berries. 
Chardonnay is a wine. Smirnoff is a vodka. 
You sleep in the bedroom. You cook in the kitchen. 
You chew with your teeth. You lick with your tongue. 
You cut with a saw. You hit with a hammer. 
You drink from a cup. You fry in a pan. 
Wasps are insects. Pythons are snakes. 
Fries are eaten with ketchup. Bread is eaten with butter. 
Trucks are vehicles. Helicopters are aircrafts. 
Socks are worn on feet. Hats are worn on heads. 
Federer plays tennis. Clapton plays guitar. 
Flour is kept in the cupboard. Popsicles are kept in the freezer. 
Picasso was a painter. Shakespeare was a poet. 
Cows give milk. Chicken give eggs. 
Bryant played basketball. Maradona played soccer. 
Manhattan is in New York. Montmatre is in Paris. 
Mirrors are glass. Lumber is wood. 
Chocolate contains cocoa. Mayonnaise contains eggs. 
Rolex produces watches. Kellogg's produces cereals. 
Earthworms live underground. Jellyfish live underwater. 
Iceland is a democracy. Qatar is a monarchy. 
Grass is green. Blood is red. 
Forests consist of trees. Dunes consist of sand. 
Kennedy was a president. Elvis was a singer. 
Earth is a planet. Africa is a continent. 
Japan is in Asia. Denmark is in Europe. 
Lipsticks are cosmetics. Crayons are stationery. 
Bacardi is a brand of rum. Pepsi is a brand of soda. 
Showers can be found in bathrooms. Mattresses can be found in beds. 
Jackets are opened with zippers. Doors are opened with handles. 
USA 's currency is dollar. Russia's currency is ruble. 
A candle is lit by fire. A bulb is lit by electricity. 
Honey comes from bees. Wool comes from sheep. 
Magazines are made from paper. Clothes are made from fabric. 
Pants are made from fabric. Cartons are made from paper. 
Screwdrivers are tools. Guns are weapons. 
Sugar is kept in the cupboard. Yoghurt is kept in the fridge. 
Scissors are used to cut. Glue is used to paste. 





Candy is sweet. Beer is bitter. 
Fish breathe through the gills. Humans breathe through the nose. 
Birds have feathers. Dogs have fur. 
Cars have wheels. Cats have legs. 
Veins transport blood. Bees transport pollen. 
A year ends with December. A week ends with Sunday. 
Scissors cut hair. Knives cut bread. 
Trains run on tracks. Buses run on highways. 
A chair is a piece of furniture. A sweater is a piece of clothing. 
Alligators are reptiles. Wolves are mammals. 
Soup is eaten with a spoon. Salad is eaten with a fork. 
Scarves are worn around the neck. Watches are worn around the wrist. 
Tuna is sold in cans. Water is sold in bottles. 
Tigers have paws. Children have hands. 
Violins have strings. Accordions have keyboards. 
Ostriches are bipeds. Horses are quadrupeds. 
Roses have thorns. Hedgehogs have stings. 
Bees live in hives. Bears live in caves. 
Rye is a grain. Seaweed is an alga. 
You smell with your nose. You hear with your ears. 
The sky is blue. Corn is yellow. 
Barcelona is in Spain. Hamburg is in Germany. 
Orangutans are primates. Beavers are rodents. 
Cobras are snakes. Tarantulas are spiders. 
Chips are made from potatoes. Ketchup is made from tomatoes. 
Oak is a wood. Steel is a metal. 
Pregnancy lasts months. Puberty lasts years. 
Sunglasses protect your eyes. Sunscreen protects your skin. 
Coffee is made from beans. Risotto is made from rice. 
Hamsters have fur. Eagles have feathers. 
The sun is shining. The wind is blowing. 
Turtles are slow. Fireworks are loud. 
Giraffes are tall. Ants are small. 
Clouds are made of water. Roads are made of asphalt. 
Swimsuits are worn in water. Pajamas are worn in bed. 
Gloves keep you warm. Umbrellas keep you dry. 
Silk is soft. Walls are firm. 
Soap makes you clean. Food makes you full. 
Towels make you dry. Grease makes you dirty. 
A dove is a sign of peace. A skull is a sign of poison. 
Flashlights are bright. Candlelight is romantic. 
Elephants are massive. Feathers are light. 
Snow is white. Strawberries are red. 
Rocks are hard. Water is liquid. 
Tankships are heavy. Mice are little. 
A pear is a fruit. Cheddar is a cheese. 
Pizza is a dish. Lemonade is a drink. 





Humans eat doughnuts. Goats eat grass. 
Peas are round. Pyramids are triangular. 
Moles are blind. Crocodiles are dangerous. 
Baking requires an oven. Driving requires a license. 
Exercise makes you fit. A virus makes you sick. 
Flowers are a common present. The flu is a common disease. 
Nile is a river. Everest is a mountain. 
Void means empty. Overcrowded  means replete. 
Comedy is a genre of movies. Rock is a genre of music. 
Sahara is a desert. Atlantic is an ocean. 
Smiling is a sign of happiness. Shivering is a sign of fear. 
The week starts with Monday. The year starts with January. 
A house has a door. A face has a mouth. 
Shoes are worn on feet. Eyeglasses are worn on the nose. 
Four is a number. Sour is a flavor. 
Coins are flat. Dice are square. 
Embryos grow in wombs. Plants grow in pots. 
You clean yourself with shower gel. You warm yourself with a blanket. 
The alphabet consists of letters. A week consists of days. 
The Bible is a famous book. The Kiss is a famous painting. 
Peperoni is a sausage. Broccoli is a vegetable. 
Kindness is a virtue. Smell is a sense. 
Birds fly in the sky. Fish live in water. 
Mud makes you dirty. Fasting makes you hungry. 
Rain is wet. Fire is hot. 
Fleas are tiny. Tankships are heavy. 
A cucumber is a vegetable. Cream is dairy. 
Blue is a color. Ten is a number. 
Apples hang on trees. Washing hangs on clotheslines. 
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